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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, California voters passed Proposition 115, the Crime
Victims Justice Reform Act.' Proposition 115 brought new statutory
and constitutional provisions, drastically re-shaping the California
criminal justice system.2 The initiative came as a response to
1. Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Prop. 115 (approved
June 5, 1990) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 24, 29, 30; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 223 (West 2006); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1995); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 189, 190.2, declared unconstitutional by People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561,
589 (Cal. 1990), 190.41, 190.5, 206, 206.1, 859, 866, 871.6, 872, 954.1, 987.05,
1049.5, 1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.3, 1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7,
1385.1, 1511 (West 2014)) [hereinafter "Proposition 115"].
2. Proposition 115 included provisions making certain types of hearsay
admissible at preliminary examination. Additionally, it expanded the definition of
first degree murder; added to the list of special circumstances that make an
individual eligible to receive the death penalty; and amended discovery,
appointment of counsel, severability, and speedy trial provisions. See CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 30(b) (allowing hearsay at preliminary examination); CAL. CONST. art. I, §
148 [Vol. 51
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California Supreme Court decisions, lower appellate decisions, and
statutory provisions that expanded the rights of the criminally
accused.3 Proponents of Proposition 115 sought to restore victims'
rights in the criminal process by using the legislative process to
override these decisions and take newly, "unnecessarily expanded"
rights away from the criminally accused.4 One such right:
confrontation at preliminary examination.5
Until 1990, California courts 6 and statutory law7 provided that
criminal defendants had a right to confront and cross-examine adverse
30(c) (requiring reciprocal discovery); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29 (vesting speedy trial
rights in the California people); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (delineating types of first
degree murder) (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (proscribing the penalty for
murder with special circumstances as death or life in prison without parole, and
listing such special circumstances) (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.05
(describing process for appointment of defense counsel) (West 2014); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1050.1 (limiting the court's discretion to sever multi-defendant cases) (West
2014). The Proposition further sought to strike a portion of Article I, section 24,
which read: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution," and replace it with language limiting
criminal defendants' rights to no greater rights than those afforded by the federal
Constitution. The California Supreme Court held this amendment was invalid
because it vested all power to interpret fundamental rights in the United States
Supreme Court. The Court also noted the extreme ideological shift taking place,
noting that the original Article I, section 24 frequently served as the basis for
extending protections beyond the limitations of the Federal Constitution. See Raven
v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087-90 (Cal. 1990).
3. Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 1(b) ("These [California Supreme Court]
decisions and statutes have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals
far beyond that which is required by the United States Constitution.").
4. Id.
5. This comment uses the term "preliminary examination" to denote the pre-
trial hearing that must precede felony prosecution by information in California.
California courts use the terms "preliminary examination" and "preliminary
hearing" interchangeably; however, the general phrase "preliminary hearing" has
significance in many other contexts (such as the federal trial and parole revocation
proceedings) and will not be used to describe California's pre-trial probable cause
hearing.
6. See Jones v. Super. Ct., 483 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Cal. 1971) (at preliminary
examination, defendant "has the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses for
the purpose of overcoming the prosecution's case"); Jennings v. Super. Ct., 428 P.2d
304, 310 (Cal. 1967) (cross-examination of prosecution witnesses at preliminary
examination "should be given wide latitude"); People v. Harris, 212 Cal. Rptr. 216,
221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (right to confrontation applies at preliminary examination);
149
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witnesses at preliminary examination. Proposition 115 took away this
right and amended the California Constitution to include Article I
section 30(b).' The constitutional amendment made hearsay
evidence9 admissible at preliminary examinations, "in order to protect
victims and witnesses in criminal cases."' 0  The initiative also
included a vehicle for this newly admissible hearsay-revised Penal
Code section 872(b)." This section allows law enforcement officers
with specified training or experience to offer hearsay statements
during the preliminary examination in lieu of the hearsay declarant's
live testimony.' 2 As a result, criminal defendants lost the opportunity
to test the credibility or reliability of accusatory statements made at
the preliminary examination,' 3  a right previously regarded as
"essential" to due process.14
People v. Haney, 202 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("the right of cross-
examination at the [preliminary] hearing is a fundamental right"); Herbert v. Super.
Ct., 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ("right to confrontation is a
substantial right," even at preliminary examination); Gallaher v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal.
Rptr. 389, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (right to confrontation at preliminary
examination is "essential" to Fourteenth Amendment due process of law).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (1981) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE §
872 (West 2008), amended by Proposition 115 (1990)).
8. Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 5.
9. "'Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a statement that was made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 2014).
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b).
12. Id. A law enforcement officer is qualified to testify to hearsay if he or she
has five years of experience or has completed training offered by the Commission
on Peace Office Standards and Training ("POST"). This course includes "training
in the investigation and reporting of cases and testifying at preliminary hearing." Id.
Appellate courts have strictly construed this requirement. See Hollowell v. Super.
Ct., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
13. Proposition 115 added Evidence Code § 1203.1, making Evidence Code §
1203 inapplicable to preliminary examination. Evidence Code § 1203 provides that
an adverse party may call hearsay declarants for cross-examination concerning their
admitted statements. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1203, 1203.1 (West 2014).
14. See Gallaher v. Super. Ct., 162 Cal. Rptr. 389, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(right to confrontation at preliminary examination is "essential" to Fourteenth
Amendment due process of law).
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This comment explores how Proposition 115 violates fundamental
due process rights of confrontation at preliminary examination and
proposes that a due process balancing test must be applied when
determining whether hearsay testimony is admissible at preliminary
examination. Part I gives an overview of the purpose of preliminary
examination in California and the confrontation rights that existed
before Proposition 115's enactment. Part II provides an analysis of
Proposition 115's hearsay provisions, the case law upholding the
provisions, and the subsequent expansion of the provisions'
application to witness testimony and co-defendant statements. Part III
scrutinizes the California Supreme Court's dismissal of constitutional
confrontation challenges to Proposition 115's hearsay provisions and
provides a basis for finding that due process confrontation rights
should apply at preliminary examination. Part IV demonstrates how
the due process balancing test would apply in determining the
admissibility of hearsay at preliminary examination, using the United
States Supreme Court's parole revocation hearing analysis as an
example. Part V briefly discusses the negative impact Proposition
115's constitutional and statutory provisions may have on former
testimony rules.
I. THE FUNCTION OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION IN CALIFORNIA
The California Constitution prescribes two methods of initiating
felony criminal proceedings against an individual: indictment and
information.15 The prosecutor has sole discretion in deciding how to
proceed.16  The purpose of both processes is to ensure there is
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14. Generally, the difference between indictment and
information is who makes the probable cause finding. When a prosecutor proceeds
by indictment, the grand jury is charged with making the probable cause
determination. If it does, the pleading submitted to the court is the indictment. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 889 (West 2014); People v. Petrilli, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480, 486
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Alternatively, a prosecutor may proceed by information by
filing a formal complaint with a Magistrate. The Magistrate is charged with making
a probable cause determination at a preliminary examination. If it does, the pleading
the prosecutor files with the court is the felony information. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 739 (West 2008).
16. Hawkins v. Super. Ct., 586 P.2d 916, 921 (Cal. 1978) (the prosecutor has
"completely unfettered discretion" in choosing to prosecute by indictment or
151
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probable cause to believe an individual is guilty of a felony before
forcing the individual to stand trial.' 7  An individual prosecuted by
information is automatically entitled to have a magistrate make this
determination at a preliminary examination.' 8  This preliminary
examination provides a wide array of procedural safeguards.19
A. The Probable Cause Finding Required Before
Prosecution by Information
In California, before a prosecutor can file an information20
bringing felony charges against a defendant, a magistrate must find
probable cause to require the defendant to answer at trial. 2 1 The
preliminary examination follows the first arraignment 22 and is the first
time in the criminal prosecution that a magistrate makes a probable
information), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14.1, as stated in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 75 (Cal. 2009).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 872,917 (West 2008).
18. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (defendant may be prosecuted by information
only after examination and commitment by a Magistrate). On the other hand, when
an individual is prosecuted by indictment, a grand jury makes the probable cause
finding and there is no preliminary hearing before a Magistrate. See Greenburg v.
Super. Ct., 121 P.2d 713, 715 (Cal. 1942).
19. Procedural rights at preliminary examination include the right to counsel,
confrontation, a public hearing, and to present evidence. See infra notes 25-27;
Johnson v. Super. Ct., 539 P.2d 792, 797 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk, J., concurring).
20. An "information" is the charging document filed with the court following
the Magistrate's probable cause determination. The initial accusatory pleading is
called the "complaint." 20A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law Pretrial Proceedings § 737
(2014).
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 2008). This is distinct from the federal
system and many other states. The Federal Constitution does not require a probable
cause finding at this stage. See Lem Woom v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); infra Part III.D. Prosecution by
information was historically frowned upon because of the lack of checks on the
prosecution-preliminary examination serves this purpose. See Johnson, 539 P.2d
at 799.
22. At arraignment, the defendant is brought before a Magistrate who must
inform him of the charges against him and of his right to counsel at every stage of
the proceeding. The validity of the arrest is not reviewed at this stage. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 14.
152 [Vol. 51
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cause finding.23 At this hearing, the defendant has the right to
counsel, 24 to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, 5 to be
present, 2 6 and to present evidence that is exculpatory, establishes an
affirmative defense, or impeaches a prosecution witness. 27
Historically, prosecution by information was viewed with skepticism
because it represented the prosecutor's unchecked charging power.28
The preliminary examination did not take on the role of a judicial
inquiry into the merits of the case until the mid-i 800s. 29 The purpose
of the modem preliminary examination is "to weed out groundless or
unsupported charges of grave offenses." 30
B. Confrontation at Preliminary Examination Before Proposition 115
Before Proposition 115, various California appellate decisions
held that confrontation rights applied at preliminary examination,31
23. It is important to note the distinction between California and federal
processes at this stage. In the federal system, before a defendant appears for
preliminary examination, he has already appeared at a Gerstein hearing and made an
initial appearance. The purpose of the Gerstein hearing is to determine whether
there was probable cause for arrest. This is separate and distinct from the
determination made at preliminary examination, which is whether there is sufficient
evidence to believe the defendant is guilty of afelony. Infra Part III.C.
24. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant is just as much
entitled to counsel at the preliminary hearing as he is at trial, in order to protect the
defendant from groundless prosecution. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10
(1969).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West 2008) (permitting cross-examination
on the defendant's behalf); see also cases cited supra note 6.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (requiring defendant's presence during
witness examination).
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West 2008) (permitting testimony of defense
witnesses if it establishes an affirmative defense, negates an element of a charged
crime, or impeaches the testimony of a prosecution witness).
28. Johnson v. Super. Ct., 539 P.2d 792, 799 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
29. Id.
30. Jaffe v. Stone, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (Cal. 1941).
31. See cases cited supra note 6; see also Stevenson v. Super. Ct., 154 Cal.
Rptr. 476, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) ("[T]he right to confrontation is not limited to
the trial stage of proceedings. Rather, it extends to any stage when there are
witnesses to be questioned.").
153
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and the rules of evidence applied at preliminary examination generally
the same way they apply at trial.32 Hearsay was permissible at
preliminary examination in the form of written statements in lieu of
live testimony, unless the witness was a victim of a crime to his or her
person or would be providing testimony amounting to eyewitness
identification of the defendant.33 For example, under these rules, the
prosecutor could submit as evidence at preliminary examination a
written statement by an individual whose car was vandalized, so long
as that individual did not observe the defendant committing the crime
and would not be identifying the defendant at trial. Proposition 115
turned these rules on their heads. 34
1. Former Penal Code Section 872(b), A Statutory Right to
Confrontation
In 1981, the California legislature enacted Penal Code sections
872(b) and (c),35 providing that the preliminary examination probable
cause finding could be based on "hearsay evidence in the form of
written statements of witnesses in lieu of testimony," except where
"the witness is a victim of a crime against his or her person, or the
testimony of the witness includes eyewitness identification of a
defendant." 36  Further, in order to offer the written statement as
evidence at the preliminary examination, section 872(b) required the
prosecutor to provide the defendant with a copy of the statement either
32. In fact, California courts held constitutional due process of law required
the same rules of evidence at each hearing. See People v. Schuber, 163 P.2d 498,
499 (Cal. 1945) ("There cannot be one rule of evidence for the trial of cases and
another rule of evidence for preliminary examinations.").
33. Before Proposition 115, the out of court statements of eyewitnesses and
victims of crimes were not admissible. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (1981)
(current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 2008)), amended by Proposition
115 (1990); Mills v. Super. Ct., 728 P.2d 211, 212 n.1 (Cal. 1986), overruled by
Proposition 115 as stated in Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262 (Cal. 1991).
34. Proposition 115 brought statutory and constitutional amendments to
specifically allow the out of court statements of witnesses to and victims of crimes.
See sources cited supra note 33.
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (1981). Proposition 115 deleted and replaced
subsection (b) in its entirety, and deleted subsection (c). See id. A 2013 revision
codified the definition of "law enforcement officer" for purposes of this section. Id.
36. Id. § 872(b) (1981).
154 [Vol. 51
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at arraignment or at least ten days before the preliminary
examination. 37
Penal Code section 872(c) allowed the defendant to call as a
witness for cross-examination the declarant whose written statement
the prosecutor offered into evidence. 38 The section further provided
that the court must require the prosecutor to make the witness
available for cross-examination if the defendant made "reasonable
efforts to secure the attendance of the witness but [was]
unsuccessful... ." If the prosecutor did not present the witness, the
witness's written statement was not accepted as evidence. 4 0
These sections guaranteed defendants the right to cross-examine,
at a minimum, the eye witnesses and victims of any crime of which he
was accused.4' In other words, under no circumstances could a
prosecutor introduce hearsay statements of any person who would be
identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. 42  In addition, if the
prosecutor intended to introduce hearsay in lieu of live testimony from
extraneous witnesses, the defendant could elect to cross-examine
those hearsay declarants. Under the 1981 amendment to Penal Code
section 872, criminal defendants could not be denied the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses at preliminary examination. 43
37. Id.
38. Id. § 872(c).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. An extremely important distinction, as Proposition 115 named these
specific individuals as those it aimed to protect. California law no longer
differentiates between hearsay statements made by eyewitnesses, victims, or any
other witness. See id. § 872.
42. The exclusion of eyewitnesses and victims as permissible hearsay
declarants appears to be rooted in traditional reliability principles. See generally
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004). The United States Supreme Court notes "the Framers' preference
for face-to-face accusation," explaining that the Sixth Amendment requires the
prosecution to produce live witnesses or demonstrate their unavailability. Roberts,
448 U.S. at 65. It is important to note that Roberts involved confrontation issues at
trial; however, under former Penal Code section 872(b), the rules against hearsay
were the same at preliminary examination as they are at trial, at least for statements
by eyewitnesses and victims. See supra note 32.
43. E.g., Mills v. Super. Ct., 728 P.2d 211, 212-16 (Cal. 1986), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30.
155
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2. Constitutional Challenges to Former Penal Code Section 872
In the years following the enactment of former Penal Code
sections 872(b) and (c), California courts were faced with deciding the
constitutionality of section 872(c)'s "reasonable efforts" requirement.
In People v. Harris, a California court of appeal decided the sections
were constitutional because they "establish[] a means whereby an
opportunity for cross-examination is guaranteed."44 In determining
whether confrontation rights are violated, the court stated, "it is the
opportunity for cross-examination that is the controlling factor." 45
The court calls cross-examination the "primary interest" of the right of
confrontation. 46
The California Supreme Court had a different opinion. In Mills v.
Superior Court, the court described confrontation rights at preliminary
examination as "fundamental procedural rights" that legislation could
not restrict without being subject to "careful scrutiny." 4 7  Upon
reviewing former Penal Code sections 872(b) and (c), the court held
the "reasonable efforts" requirement violated due process because it
placed a substantial burden on the defendant by requiring the
defendant to procure prosecution witnesses, effectively allowing some
hearsay testimony to be admitted without being subject to cross-
examination. 48 The court pointed out that no other evidence code
section allowed substitute written testimony when a witness is alive
and available to appear. 4 9  This type of liberal interpretation of
criminal defendants' rights prompted a drastic shift in the California
criminal justice system,50 and four years after Mills v. Superior Court,
Proposition 115 was born.
II. PROPOSITION 115, THE CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT
Proposition 115's stated purpose was to restore balance and
fairness to California's criminal justice system by creating a system
44. People v. Harris, 212 Cal. Rptr. 216, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
45. Id. at 223.
46. Id.
47. Mills, 728 P.2d at 214.
48. Id. at 215-16.
49. Id. at 216.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
156 [Vol. 51
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that treats victims and witnesses carefully and respectfully. 5 1 The
initiative declared, "the rights of crime victims are too often
ignored," 52 and expressed a need to redress California Supreme Court
decisions that "unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused."5 3
Similarly, the constitutional amendment allowing hearsay at
preliminary examinations declared its motive: "to protect victims and
witnesses in criminal cases."5 4 Unfortunately, in its efforts to protect
victims' rights, the California legislature has encroached upon the
rights of the criminally accused.
Section 18 of Proposition 115 deleted former Penal Code sections
872(b) and (c) and replaced section (b) to provide that the preliminary
examination probable cause finding "may be based in whole or in part
upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the
statements of declarants made out of court and offered for the truth of
the matter asserted."5 5 This section no longer distinguishes the out of
court statements of victims or witnesses to crimes, 56 and it strips
defendants of the right to cross-examine hearsay declarants.
One year after Proposition 115 became law, the California
Supreme Court heard Whitman v. Superior Court, a case raising state
and federal constitutional challenges to the new hearsay provisions.57
The court deemed the provisions constitutional.58  Following
Whitman, the California Supreme Court expanded Proposition 115's
hearsay provisions to include officer testimony relaying the out of
court statements of expert witnesses and co-defendants, in Hosek v.
51. Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 1(a).
52. Id.
53. Id. Before Proposition 115, Article I, Section 24 of the California
Constitution served as a vehicle for expanding federal constitutional rights. It read,
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by
the United States Constitution." Proposition 115 amended Article I, Section 24 to
read, in pertinent part, "This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to
afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution
of the United States . . . ." The California Supreme Court subsequently held this was
an invalid limitation on judicial power and the individual force of the California
constitution. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087-90 (Cal. 1990).
54. Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 5.
55. Id. § 18.
56. See supra Part I.B.1.
57. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262 (Cal. 1991).
58. Id.
157
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Superior Court59 and People v. Miranda,60 respectively. In 2010, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal heard a similar case, challenging the
hearsay provisions of Proposition 115 under the Federal
Constitution. 61 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the California Supreme
Court that Proposition 115 is constitutional under the Federal
Constitution. 62
A. Whitman v. Superior Court, Confrontation After Proposition 115
1. Introduction
Whitman v. Superior Court brought the first challenge to
Proposition 115's hearsay provisions.63  Whitman faced multiple
felony Vehicle and Health and Safety Code violations. 64  At
Whitman's preliminary examination, the prosecutor called a law
enforcement officer as the sole witness. 6 5 The officer was not an
arresting or investigating officer in the case, and had no personal
knowledge of the charges against Whitman. 66 However, because he
had eight years of law enforcement experience, the officer was
qualified to testify to hearsay. 67 Throughout the preliminary
examination, the officer revealed he had not discussed the incident
with the investigating officer, did not know the reporting officer, and
first became aware of the incident the morning of the hearing. 68 The
officer was nonetheless allowed to testify to the contents of the
investigating officer's report, and to give an opinion as to whether the
testifying officer believed Whitman was under the influence based on
the contents of the investigating officer's report. 69 The trial court
found probable cause, holding Whitman to answer on the charges at
59. Hosek v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. 1992); see infra Part II.B.
60. People v. Miranda, 1 P.3d 73 (Cal. 2000); see infra Part II.C.
61. Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2010).
62. Id.
63. See Whitman, 820 P.2d 262.
64. Id. at 264.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also supra note 12.
68. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 264.
69. Id.
158 [Vol. 51
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trial despite the testifying officer's lack of personal knowledge and
inability to identify Whitman as the defendant.70
2. Constitutional Challenges
Whitman raised federal constitutional challenges to the relevant
provisions of Proposition 115.71 He argued, unsuccessfully, that the
use of hearsay testimony at his preliminary examination violated his
Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination. 72
The court rejected Whitman's Confrontation Clause challenge, citing
two reasons why the right to confrontation does not extend to
preliminary examination: (1) there is no right to this hearing,73 and (2)
the right to confrontation is a trial right.74 This comment discusses the
court's analysis in detail in Part III.
3. Statutory Interpretation
Whitman further argued that the language of Proposition 115
should not be read to permit the hearsay statements of police officer
declarants.7 ' The court also rejected this argument, holding that a
statute should not be given literal meaning if doing so would result in
"absurd consequences," and the statute should instead be read "as to
conform to the spirit of the act." 76 Ironically, in deciding how to
interpret the statute according to the "spirit of the act," the court
ignores the qualifying language, "in order to protect victims and
witnesses," and simply relies on the definition of "declarant" as
provided by California Evidence Code section 135, finding that
70. Id. at 265.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. Whitman raised additional challenges under the Federal and California
Constitutions not pertinent to the discussion in this comment. See id. at 273-74.
73. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 271.
74. Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).
75. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 266.
76. Id. (citing People v. Pieters, 802 P.2d 420, 422 (Cal. 1991)). The court
does not delve into examples of "absurd consequences," but does acknowledge its
refusal to give the statute its literal meaning. See Whitman, 820 P.2d at 266.
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Proposition 115 does not exclude any person as a declarant because a
declarant is, quite literally, any person."
4. Positive Result, Negative Implications
Though the court rejected Whitman's statutory interpretation and
constitutional challenges, it ultimately agreed that the officer's
testimony was impermissible, holding that the probable cause
determination cannot be based on the testimony of a non-investigating
officer "reader" who merely reads from an investigating officer's
report78  because "reader" testimony does not meet reliability
standards. 79 With its narrow holding, the court passed on the perfect
opportunity to limit Proposition 115 testimony to those statements
made by crime victims and witnesses needing protection. Instead, the
court held the testifying officer would be permitted to relay
information contained in the investigating officer's report if the
testifying officer had sufficient knowledge of the case.80
77. Id. at 267 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 135 (West 2011) ("a person who
makes a statement")). This linguistic analysis requires looking at both the
constitutional amendment and the revised Penal Code section. The constitutional
provision reads in pertinent part: "In order to protect victims and witnesses in
criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall be admissible at preliminary hearings, as
prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative process." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 30(b). The prescription came in the revision of Penal Code section
872(b): "the finding of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the
sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer . .. relating the statements of
declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 2008). The court's general finding that law
enforcement officers may relay the out of court statements of all declarants ignores
the caveat put in place by the constitutional amendment, that hearsay evidence is
admissible at preliminary examination for the limited purpose of protecting victims
and witnesses.
78. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 267.
79. Id. at 268 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980)). The court's
reliance on Roberts is problematic in light of Crawford v. Washington, an issue not
discussed in this comment. See generally Jay Stoegbauer, Proposition 115 After
Crawford v. Washington: it is Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of Police Officer
Hearsay Testimony in Preliminary Hearings, 34 W. ST. U. L. REv. 143 (2007)
(proposing Whitman holding is outdated because statements made to police officers
are testimonial and require full cross-examination in light of Crawford v.
Washington).
80. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 267.
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One officer testifying for another only serves efficiency purposes,
not to protect crime victims and witnesses, and seems to be the type of
"absurd consequence" the California Supreme Court cautioned
against. Since Whitman, the hearsay provision has been extended
beyond police officers, to include expert witnesses81  and
accomplices 82 as permissible hearsay declarants, none of which
should be included in the narrow category, "crime victims and
witnesses." 83
B. Hosek v. Superior Court, Experts as Hearsay Declarants
One year after Whitman, in Hosek v. Superior Court, a California
Court of Appeal decided that a qualified law enforcement officer
could testify to a forensic expert's out of court statements, without
ever mentioning the express purpose of Proposition 115.84 In Hosek,
the defendant was transported to a hospital to have her blood drawn
after a law enforcement officer suspected she was driving under the
influence.85 The officer sent the blood sample to a crime lab to be
tested for alcohol content. 86 The day of the preliminary examination,
the officer phoned the criminalist who tested the blood sample,
interviewed him, and was permitted to testify to the criminalist's
results.87 The defendant was held on the charges, despite the officer's
testimony on cross-examination that he had never seen the testing
device, did not know how the device measured blood alcohol, and did
not know how the device guaranteed reliability. 88
On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearsay exception
Proposition 115 created should not extend to out of court statements
81. See infra Part II.B.
82. See infra Part II.C.
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (1990). While the California Supreme Court
gives plain meaning to the word "witness" as describing any person who offers live
testimony, the legislative intent can be inferred from the previous version of Penal
Code § 872(b), drawing a distinction between eyewitnesses of and victims to crimes,
and ordinary lay witnesses. See supra note 33.
84. Hosek v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. 1992).
85. Id. at 651.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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made by expert witnesses, and that the testifying officer did not have
sufficient personal knowledge to assure the reliability of the expert's
statements.89 The court held that neither Whitman nor Proposition
115 exclude expert witness statements from Penal Code section
872(b) permissible hearsay. 90 The court's reasoning was similar to
the Whitman court's-an expert is a declarant in the same way a
police officer or a layperson is a declarant. 91 This certainly
contradicts the purpose of Proposition 115. The title of the measure,
the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, coupled with the language of
the constitutional and statutory provisions, suggests that hearsay
should be permitted via qualified law enforcement officers when the
safety of a victim or a witness to a crime might be compromised.
Further, expert testimony raises additional reliability concerns 92 that a
defendant loses the opportunity to challenge when the expert is not
required to testify at the preliminary examination.
C. People v. Miranda, Co-Defendant Accomplices as Hearsay
Declarants
Though the Whitman court expressly identified reliability as the
threshold test for the admissibility of Proposition 115 testimony, in
2000, the California Supreme Court held out of court accomplice
confessions are permissible at preliminary examination when offered
by a qualified law enforcement officer, despite the inherent
unreliability of these statements. 93 In Miranda, multiple defendants
were charged with murder. 94 At their joint preliminary examination,
an investigating officer testified about one co-defendant's confession
89. Id. at 652.
90. Id. ("on the face of section 872 there is no limitation whatsoever on the
'declarants' whose extrajudicial statements may be received in evidence in a
preliminary examination").
91. Id.
92. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
93. People v. Miranda, 1 P.3d 73, 79-80 (Cal. 2000) (noting that the inherent
unreliability of accomplice confessions goes to the weight of the statement, not its
admissibility).
94. Id. at 74.
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that implicated the other defendants. 95 The prosecutor stated he
intended to use the statements as Proposition 115 testimony and asked
the magistrate to attribute the confession to all defendants, not just to
the declarant defendant. 96 The magistrate ruled that the co-conspirator
statement, communicated through the investigating officer, could not
be used against the other defendants at the preliminary examination,
and subsequently granted the non-declarant defendants' motion to
dismiss.9 7 The prosecutor's motion to reinstate the complaint against
defendant Miranda was denied, and the prosecutor appealed. 98
On appeal, Miranda raised federal constitutional challenges to
Proposition 115, by arguing accomplice confessions should not be
admissible as Proposition 115 testimony because the statements are
inherently untrustworthy. 99 Citing a previous decision permitting
magistrates to rely on accomplice testimony to find probable cause, 00
the California Supreme Court held that the magistrate could consider
the co-defendant's confession-offered via law enforcement officer as
Proposition 115 testimony-despite their inherent unreliability. 101
Miranda is significant because the Whitman decision was based
on the reliability of the officer's testimony.102 In a situation akin to
Whitman where one officer testifies in the absence of another,
assuming the testifying officer has personal knowledge, there are no
indicia of unreliability-there is no motive to fabricate. The same is
not true for accomplice confessions.' 03 The Miranda court reasoned,
95. Id.
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id. at 77. The Magistrate reasoned that the Aranda/Bruton rule applied at
preliminary examination. The Aranda/Bruton rule bars admitting co-defendant
statements implicating the other defendant if the confessing co-defendant does not
testify in court and is thus not subject to cross-examination. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1965),
superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Fletcher, 917 P.2d
187, 194 (Cal. 1996).
98. Miranda, 1 P.3d at 77.
99. Id. at 78-79.
100. Id. at 79 (citing People v. McRae, 187 P.2d 741 (Cal. 1947)).
101. Miranda, 1 P.3d at 79.
102. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262, 266-68 (Cal. 1991).
103. See In re Mitchell P., 587 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Cal. 1978). "Accomplice
testimony is generally suspect because it may have been proferred in the hope of
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however, that a magistrate is aware of the potential untrustworthiness
of accomplice confessions and is able to afford the statements
appropriate weight in making probable cause determinations.104 For
this reason, the court determined accomplice statements implicating
another defendant are admissible at preliminary examination, although
they may never be admissible at trial. "0
California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 115,106
embracing the initiative's promise of safety to the victims and
witnesses of crimes by not requiring their live testimony at
preliminary examination. This hearsay exception has been
unjustifiably expanded to include police officers, expert witnesses,
and accomplice co-defendants as hearsay declarants.
D. Peterson v. California, The Ninth Circuit Weighs In
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of
Proposition 115. In Peterson v. California, defendant Peterson filed a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court, challenging Proposition 115
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 0 7  Peterson was
charged with several Health and Safety Code violations. 08  At his
preliminary examination, the prosecution called the investigating
officer as the sole witness and the magistrate bound Peterson over for
trial.109 A jury subsequently convicted him.o"0
leniency or immunity, and thus greater weight may be accorded such testimony than
is warranted." Id.
104. Miranda, 1 P.3d 73 at 80.
105. Id. The accomplice confessions would not be subject to cross-
examination at trial, thus inadmissible, if the defendant declarant invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination at trial. The Miranda prosecutor admitted he did
not have a case against Miranda if the accomplice co-defendant refused to testify at
trial. Id. at 81.
106. Proposition 115 passed by 57% of the popular vote. California
Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act (1990), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/CalifomiaProposition_115,_the_%22CrimeVictimsJustice
_ReformAct%22 (1990) (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
107. Peterson v. California, 604 F.3d 1166, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2010).
108. Id. at 1168.
109. Id.
110. Id. The felony counts against Peterson were dismissed before trial;
Peterson was convicted of remaining misdemeanor counts. Id.
164 [Vol. 51
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Whether hearsay testimony is permissible at preliminary
examinations was a novel issue in the Ninth Circuit. Citing Whitman,
the Ninth Circuit recognized Sixth Amendment confrontation rights
do not extend to preliminary examination because the Federal
Constitution does not guarantee a right to a preliminary examination,
and the right to confrontation is a trial right.1"'
The court also rejected Peterson's Fourteenth Amendment due
process challenge, holding that permitting hearsay during preliminary
examination does not deprive a defendant of due process.11 2  The
court reasoned that hearsay is permissible at grand jury indictments" 3
and due process protections at preliminary examination should not be
greater than those afforded in grand jury proceedings. 1 14 The Ninth
Circuit dismissed Peterson's due process challenge on these grounds,
without conducting the requisite due process analysis."t5 This due
process analysis is the subject of Part IV of this comment.
III. WHERE THE WHITMAN COURT FELL SHORT
The California Supreme Court rejected Whitman's Confrontation
Clause challenge for two separate reasons.11 6 First, the court reasons,
there is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary examination
111. Id. at 1169.
112. Id. at 1171.
113. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956).
114. Peterson, 604 F.3d at 1171 ("[I]f the phrase 'due process of law' in the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the use of hearsay in grand jury proceedings,
then the same phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be read to prohibit the
use of hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing.").
115. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)
("consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action" (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961))).
116. See supra Part II.A.2.
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because federal felonies are prosecuted by indictment. 117 Second, in
the court's view, the right to confrontation is a trial right.118
A. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees, "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."ll 9  The California
Constitution provides a similar guarantee: "The defendant in a
criminal cause has the right to. . . be confronted with the witnesses
against the defendant." 20 The California Supreme Court declared
Proposition 115 an exception to the broad confrontation rights granted
by the California Constitution, requiring all challenges to this portion
of the proposition be raised under the Federal Confrontation Clause.'21
Thus, this section focuses only on the Federal Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 2
"There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the United States
Supreme] Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expression of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 12 3 The
majority of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has
focused on how the right applies at trial.124 However, the Court's
right to counsel analysis demonstrates that the scope of this Sixth
117. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262, 271 (Cal. 1991). But see Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding that there is no right to indictment by a
grand jury outside the federal system).
118. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 271 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725
(1968)).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
120. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
121. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 269.
122. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
123. Id. at 402.
124. This is likely because the decision of which proceeding to use to make a
probable cause determination is left up to each individual State. See infra Part III.D.
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Amendment "trial right"12 extends beyond the trial itself.12 6  The
Court's decision that the right to counsel extends to preliminary
examination was based primarily on the defendant's opportunity to
cross-examine at that stage. 127 To date, however, the Court has not
held that full Sixth Amendment confrontation rights apply at
preliminary examination.
B. The Right to Confrontation: More Than A Trial Right
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court decided Barber v.
Page, giving birth to the oft-quoted assertion, "[t]he right to
confrontation is basically a trial right."l 28 The Whitman Court relies
on this quote, reading it on its face to mean that confrontation rights
do not apply to any sort of pretrial hearings.129 However, the Barber
decision was not concerned with the defendant's confrontation rights
at his preliminary examination-in fact, the defendant was given the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at that hearing.13 0 The issue,
rather, was whether an unavailable witness's preliminary examination
testimony was admissible at trial as a substitute for live testimony. 31
The Court held the preliminary examination testimony was not an
adequate substitute because the right to confrontation at trial is a
fundamental right.132  Contrary to the Whitman court's
interpretation,' 3 3 the United States Supreme Court did not limit
confrontation rights as only applying at trial.
125. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 795 (1968).
126. "Accordingly, the principle of Powell v. Alabama. .. requires that we
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair
trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross examine the witnesses against him
and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself." Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).
127. Id. at 9.
128. Barber, 390 U.S. at 795. See also Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262,
271 (Cal. 1991).
129. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 271.
130. Barber, 390 U.S. at 722.
131. Id. at 720.
132. Id. at 725.
133. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 271.
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C California's Preliminary Examination as a Critical Stage
In upholding Proposition 115's narrowing of preliminary
examination confrontation rights, the California Supreme Court
likened the preliminary examination to a federal Gersteinl34
hearing.' 35 In Gerstein v. Pugh, the United States Supreme Court
decided the Federal Constitution requires a judicial determination of
probable cause for arrest when a person is detained under a
prosecutor's information. 136 However, the defendant is not entitled to
"the full panoply of adversary safeguards--counsel, confrontation,
cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses," at this
hearing. 137 The Court based this decision on an important distinction:
the hearing's "limited function and nonadversary character." 3 8 The
specific and exclusive purpose of the Gerstein hearing is to determine
whether probable cause exists to detain the individual,139 not to
provide judicial review of the decision to prosecute.' 4 0  The
defendant's release following the federal Gerstein hearing does not
mean he will not be prosecuted.141
By contrast, in California, the purpose of the preliminary
examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to
prosecute the individual.142  This distinction is important because a
Gerstein hearing is not a critical stage.143  California courts have
repeatedly agreed that California's preliminary examination is a
134. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
135. Whitman, 820 P.2d at 271-73.
136. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
137. Id. at 119.
138. Id. at 121.
139. Id. at 120. Federal criminal procedure provides for a subsequent
preliminary examination to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to hold the
defendant for trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1982); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1; Coleman v.
Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (purpose of preliminary hearing is
to determine whether probable cause exists to proceed to trial).
140. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541,
545 (1962) (a judicial hearing is not required before the Government may prosecute
by information).
141. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
142. Galindo v. Super. Ct., 235 P.3d 1, 3.(Cal. 2010).
143. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103.
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critical stage of prosecution where counsel is required. 144 In Gerstein,
the United States Supreme Court distinguishes the hearing
determining probable cause for arrest from the hearing designated for
determination of probable cause to prosecute, as it examined in
Coleman v. Alabama.14 5 In Coleman, the issue before the Court was
whether Alabama's preliminary hearing was a critical stage in the
prosecution, requiring Sixth Amendment effective assistance of
counsel.146  The Court held Alabama's preliminary hearing was a
critical stage. In Gerstein, the Court specifically referenced
Alabama's preliminary hearing as distinct from a hearing determining
probable cause for arrest, listing "two critical factors."l 47  First, the
function of Alabama's preliminary hearing was to determine whether
sufficient evidence existed to charge the defendant with an offense.14 8
Second, the Court gave particular attention to the fact tiat at
preliminary hearing, the defendant was allowed to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.14 9 The fundamental right to counsel necessarily
includes effective confrontation and cross-examination.' 50
California's preliminary examination serves the exact same
purpose as Alabama's preliminary hearing as examined in Coleman
and Gerstein.15 1 Unlike the Gerstein hearing, a finding of no probable
144. Jennings v. Super. Ct., 428 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Cal. 1967) (right to counsel
at preliminary hearing is a substantial right); People v. Lopez, 384 P.2d 16, 27 (Cal.
1963) ("a defendant has the right to assistance of counsel ... at the preliminary
examination"); People v. Harris, 212 Cal. Rptr. 216, 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(preliminary examination is a critical stage of the prosecution); People v. Johnson,
91 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (preliminary hearing is a critical stage
under Coleman, requiring counsel). A critical stage is any pretrial procedure that
"would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without
counsel." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122.
145. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
146. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 3.
147. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 (citing Coleman, 399 U.S. at 1-25).
148. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
149. Id.
150. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308 (1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
151. Criminal defendant will be held to answer, "if it appears from the
examination that a public offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause
to believe that the defendant is guilty." CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 2008); see
also People v. Bomar, 238 P. 758, 760 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) ("Before any accused
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cause at preliminary examination in California means the defendant
cannot be prosecuted under the pending information.' 52 The Whitman
court, nonetheless, held California's preliminary examination
sufficiently resembles the Gerstein hearing.153  However, since
California guarantees the right to counsel at preliminary
examination,154 the right to effective cross-examination is both
complementary and paramount. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court recognizes that cross-examination plays an integral role at
preliminary examination: to influence a magistrate's decision to bind
over a defendant on the charges he faces.' 5 5
D. Preliminary Examination, An Alternative to Indictment
For decades in California, the overwhelming majority of felonies
have been prosecuted by information.156  More than one hundred
years before Proposition 115 and Whitman, the United States Supreme
Court held, in Hurtado v. California, that due process does not require
the states to institute Fifth Amendment grand jury procedures.' 5 7 The
states are free to do away with the grand jury system and develop their
person can be called upon to defend himself on any charge prosecuted by
information, he is entitled to a preliminary examination upon said charge, ... held as
to whether the crime for which it is sought to prosecute him has been committed,
and whether there is sufficient cause to believe him guilty thereof."), superseded by
statute on other grounds, as stated in People v. Rankin, 337 P.2d 182, 191 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959).
152. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 (noting that a
finding of no probable cause in Alabama's preliminary hearing could mean the
defendant would not be prosecuted).
153. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262, 273 (Cal. 1991).
154. See cases cited supra note 144.
155. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
156. See Johnson v. Super. Ct., 539 P.2d 792, 799 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Justice Mosk explains that the development of preliminary
examination as a "procedural outgrowth of the information" led to a movement to
abolish the grand jury system in the 1920s and early 1930s. Id. at 799-800, 800 n.8.
157. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (holding, if the grand
jury system were intended to extend to the States, the express language used in the
Fifth Amendment would have been included in the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962) ("Ever since Hurtado v.
Calfornia, this Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional
impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions.").
170 [Vol. 51
25
de la Cerda: Trading Defendants' Rights for Victims' Rights:  A Due Process Ri
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014
2014] TRADING DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS' RIGHTS
own judicial proceedings, as long as the alternate proceedings provide
due process.' In fact, the United States Supreme Court based this
decision on California's preferred alternate proceeding-the
preliminary examination.159 The Court found California's preliminary
examination satisfied due process requirements as an acceptable
substitute for the indictment process because the criminal defendant
had the right to counsel and cross-examination.160 While the states are
not required to provide any specific process,161 where they do, the
process must adhere to federal due process standards. 162 As a due
process alternative to indictment by grand jury, the preliminary
examination comes with constitutional rights,163 including the
fundamental right to confrontation.
E. Source of Confrontation Rights at Preliminary Examination
Despite its warning that "the Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be
lost, justice will not still be done,"' 64 the United States Supreme Court
has not expressly extended Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
application to preliminary examinations.' 65 It is important to note,
however, that the Court has never refused to do so. Whether full
confrontation rights apply at preliminary examination is an open
158. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535.
159. Id. at 538.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 535.
162. Hurtado, 110 U.S. 516; see, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
163. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (explaining that a
preliminary hearing is a critical stage requiring assistance of counsel).
164. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
165. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes Sixth Amendment confrontation rights obligatory to the States.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965). The Court has also equated
confrontation rights with the assistance of counsel rights. In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (finding basic rights in our system include, "as a minimum, a right
to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by
counsel"). For an analysis equating the right to counsel with confrontation rights at
preliminary examination, see Stoegbauer, supra note 79.
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issue.166 About the rights to confrontation and cross-examination, the
Court has said, "they have ancient roots.1 67 They find expression in
the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal casesl 68 the
accused shall enjoy the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.' This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from
erosion."' 69  Since the Court has not mandated one procedure the
States must follow when initiating a criminal prosecution,170 it would
find difficulty creating a bright-line rule as to when Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights must apply pre-trial. However, the Court has
previously held that, outside the trial itself, confrontation rights exist
through Fourteenth Amendment due process.171 Confrontation rights
at preliminary examination should be viewed under the same light.
IV. A DUE PROCESS SOLUTION: BALANCING INTERESTS
The rights to confrontation and cross-examination are "an
essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal." 72 However, these rights are not
absolute. 173 Other legitimate "competing interests"1 74 may override
the rights.17 5 Denying a defendant confrontation "calls into question
166. The closest the Court came to answering this question was its
examination of the Gerstein hearing, where it held that States may elect to
experiment with what rights to provide during preliminary examinations of the
decision to prosecute. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975).
167. Pretrial cross-examination has deep historical roots. Under the sixteenth
century Marian committal statute, at least one case notes a prisoner's opportunity to
cross-examine during the Magistrate's examination of the accusing witness. See
Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 493, 519
(2007).
168. Not, "criminal trials."
169. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965) (quoting Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)).
170. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
171. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that
parolees have a due process right to confrontation at parole revocation hearings).
172. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
173. Id.
174. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
175. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204
(1972)).
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the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process,"' and the competing
interest must be analyzed closely. 176
Proposition 115 was concerned with an important interest: the
rights and protection of crime victims and witnesses.177 This section
proposes applying a Fourteenth Amendment due process balancing
test that considers both the defendant's interest in confrontation and
the State's interest in protecting victims and witnesses of crimes.
Applying this test to preliminary examination would allow police
officers to offer hearsay testimony only when the government's
interest in protecting a victim or witness outweighs the defendant's
interest in confrontation. This would provide for a more fair process
by increasing the reliability of testimony offered to support a probable
cause finding.' 7 8  The United States Supreme Court has mandated
applying a similar test to parole revocation hearings.-179
A. A Due Process Right to Confrontation
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides States
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."18 0 It extends protection from state infringement on
176. Id. (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969)).
177. See supra Part II.
178. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (stating,
"the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence ...
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be tested in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination").
179. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). "Parole is the conditional
release of a prisoner who has already served part of his or her state prison sentence."
Prison Law Office v. Koenig, 233 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). An
individual who has been released on parole is considered a "constructive prisoner"
serving the remainder of his or her sentence out of custody instead of in prison. Id.
As such, a State may impose conditions the individual must adhere to while on
parole. Id. at 595. The ultimate question at a parole revocation hearing is whether
the parolee can continue to be rehabilitated outside of prison, or if he poses a risk to
society and should be returned to confinement in prison. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon
and Parole § 127 (2014). Before 2012, parole revocation hearings in California
were considered administrative and were conducted by the Board of Parole
Hearings. See Williams v. Super. Ct., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 694-95 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014). Since 2012, the California Penal Code has been amended to confer parole
jurisdiction for parole revocation hearings on trial courts. Id.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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specific fundamental rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.' 8 ' The Fourteenth Amendment
provides this protection by requiring procedural due process.182
Procedural due process guarantees that States cannot deprive
individuals of constitutionally protected interests without a fair
procedure.1 83 The United States Supreme Court has said determining
what process is due is a constitutional question to be addressed by the
judiciary, not by the legislature.184 The Court addressed this question
in the context of parole revocation hearings in Morrissey v. Brewer,185
holding that during parole revocation hearings, due process requires
cross-examination as a minimum protection.' 86
This section begins with an analysis of Morrissey v. Brewer,
discusses how Morrissey has been applied to the admissibility of
hearsay in the Ninth Circuit, and finally, demonstrates how a test
inspired by Morrissey can be applied to the question of the
admissibility of hearsay at preliminary examination, as permitted by
Proposition 115.
B. Due Process Confrontation at Parole Revocation Hearings
In Morrissey v. Brewer, defendant Morrissey was arrested on a
parole violation, resulting in subsequent revocation of parole and
incarceration.18 7 Morrissey filed a habeas petition, alleging he was
deprived due process because his parole was revoked without a
hearing.' 8 8 In determining whether due process rights apply to parole
revocations, the Court noted, "whether any procedural protections are
due depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned
to suffer grievous loss."' 89 Further, the due process determination
181. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
183. Id. at 125.
184. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.4.2 (3d ed. 2006)
(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)).
185. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
186. Id. at 489.
187. Id. at 472-73.
188. Id. at 474.
189. Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court further noted that the
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depends on whether the nature of the individual's interest at issue is
"one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 90 Once this determination is made, the
question remains what process is due.191
The Court held that the parole revocation decision is subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment,192 even though parole revocation is not part
of the criminal prosecution,193 because the parolee has a great interest
in retaining his liberty. 94 The Court notes that in addition to the
parolee's interest in his own liberty, society also has an interest-"the
chance of restoring him to normal and useful life."l 95 Terminating the
parolee's liberty is a 'grievous loss' and requires some process. 196
determining what process is due, the Court considered the State's
interest in revoking parole, acknowledging that the State has an
interest in returning a parolee to prison when it finds he has failed to
follow his parole conditions.19 7 Despite this, the Court held that the
State has no interest in revoking parole without procedural guarantees,
to ensure parole revocation is not based on erroneous information. 98
The Court then examined the two stages of parole revocation: the
preliminary hearing following arrestl99 and the formal revocation
hearing. 200 The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine
whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the individual has
Court of Appeals "recognized that the traditional view of parole as a privilege rather
than a vested right is no longer dispositive as to whether due process is applicable."
Id. at 474.
190. Id. at 481 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
191. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
192. Id. at 482.
193. Id. at 480. There is room for argument that more due process rights apply
during the preliminary examination than at parole revocation since the preliminary
examination probable cause determination does have a direct bearing on the criminal
prosecution. Parole revocation hearings, on the other hand, occur post-trial and after
sentencing on the original criminal charge.
194. Id. at 482.
195. Id. at 484.
196. Id. at 482.
197. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
198. Id. at 483-84.
199. The Court likens this hearing to a probable cause for arrest determination.
Id. at 485.
200. Id. at 488.
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violated parole conditions. 2 0' At this hearing, an independent officer
makes a preliminary decision of whether there is probable cause to
hold the parolee to answer to the parole board, who makes the final
revocation decision.2 02 To promote fairness, a neutral officer other
than the parole officer reporting the violations makes this decision.203
Due process requires the parolee have notice of this hearing and be
free to testify and present evidence on his own behalf. 204 Lastly, the
parolee may request the witnesses against him be made available for
questioning in his presence. 205 Thus, even at this informal preliminary
hearing, parolees are afforded confrontation and cross-examination
rights.
At the formal revocation hearing, the parolee has the opportunity
to show he did not violate the conditions of his parole, or that the
violation does not warrant revocation. 206 The "minimum
requirements of due process" at this stage include notice of the
violations, disclosure of the evidence against the parolee, the
opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the right to
confrontation and cross-examination, a neutral hearing body, and a
written statement describing the reasons for parole revocation. 207 The
right to confrontation and cross-examination exists "unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation."2 08  The Court gives an example of good cause to
restrain confrontation rights: an informant who would be at a risk of
harm if his identity were revealed. 209 The good cause requirement is
rooted in the parolee's interest in maintaining his liberty.210
To determine whether admitting hearsay at the revocation hearing
violates the parolee's right to confrontation, "the court must weigh the
[parolee's] interest in his constitutionally guaranteed right to
201. Id. at 485.
202. Id. at 487.
203. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-86.
204. Id. at 486-87.
205. Id. at 487.
206. Id. at 488.
207. Id. at 489.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 487.
210. See id. at 482.
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confrontation against the Government's good cause for denying it."211
The weight to be given the parolee's confrontation rights depends
primarily on two factors: (1) the importance of the hearsay evidence to
the court's determination, and (2) the nature of the facts the hearsay
evidence is offered to prove.2 12
1. The Morrissey Test Applied to Hearsay at Probation Revocation
Hearings213
The Ninth Circuit first applied the Morrissey test to hearsay
offered by a probation officer at a revocation hearing in United States
v. Comito.2 14  At probationer Comito's revocation hearing, his
probation officer offered statements made by Comito's ex-girlfriend,
the victim of the fraud charges Comito faced.215 Comito argued the
hearsay testimony violated his due process right to confrontation. 2 16
The court conducted the Morrissey balancing test and found that the
hearsay statements did in fact violate Comito's confrontation rights. 2 17
In applying the first factor, the probationer's interest in the right to
confrontation, the court emphasized that the more significant the
211. United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484. This will subsequently be referred to as "the Morrissey
test."
212. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171. Courts have also considered other factors,
such as the potential consequence of its finding. See id. at 1170 n.7.
213. Though some differences exist between probation and parole, the United
States Supreme Court has held due process rights apply equally at the requisite
revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (holding, "a
probationer, like a parolee is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing
under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer."). California Penal Code
section 1203.2 governs probation and parole revocation hearings in California. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch.
931 of 2014 Reg.Sess., Res. Ch. I of 2013-2014 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions
on 2014 ballots). However, parole revocation did not fall within the scope of section
1203.2 until its amendment in 2012. Williams v. Super. Ct., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685,
694 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Since then, courts have struggled to settle on a process for
probation and parole revocation; however, it remains clear that the due process
standards set forth in Morrissey will continue to apply. See id. at 698.
214. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1166.
215. Id. at 1168-69.
216. Id. at 1169-70; see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 471.
217. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1173.
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evidence is to the court's ultimate finding, the more important it is that
the probationer have an opportunity to test the reliability of the
evidence on cross-examination.218 The court found Comito's interest
was significant because the testimony spoke to the central issue of the
court's finding on the probation violation-whether Comito had the
witness's permission to use her cards and checks. 2 19 Comito's interest
in confrontation was further strengthened by the nature of the unsworn
statements, which the court characterized as the "least reliable type of
hearsay." 220 The court contrasted these "unsworn verbal allegations"
with business and public records, finding the statements unreliable
because they were not made under oath or in any context that would
give them credibility.22 1 Under the second factor, the Government's
good cause in denying confrontation, the court examined the
Government's claim that the ex-girlfriend declarant feared Comito. 222
The court gave little weight to this claim because the Government did
not offer any evidence to substantiate it.22 3 The court ultimately held
the Government lacked good cause in failing to produce the witness,
and its interest in not doing so did not outweigh Comito's substantial
interest in confrontation.224
The Ninth Circuit again applied the Morrissey test to victim
statements offered as hearsay in United States v. Holden.22 5  At
Holden's revocation hearing, the Government offered the hearsay
statements of two individuals, and on appeal, Holden argued the
hearsay violated his due process right to confrontation. 226 While the
court did not delve into the nature of the statements, it held that the
218. Id. at 1171 (citing United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.
1993)).
219. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1172.
223. Id. The court also cited evidence to the contrary. Comito's defense
counsel produced evidence that the ex-girlfriend witness visited and called Comito
in jail nearly every day, and she previously expressed concerns that she would face
legal trouble if she testified at the revocation hearing in a manner contrary to the
story she told Comito's probation officer. Id.
224. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1172.
225. United States v. Holden, 473 Fed. App'x. 759 (9th Cir. 2012).
226. Id. at 760.
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Government had good cause in not producing the two witnesses. 227
The witnesses expressed fear of retaliation by Holden since the
beginning of their involvement in the case, and both witnesses
recanted their testimony as it became clearer to them they would be
further involved in testifying against Holden.228 The court further
found the witnesses' statements were sufficiently reliable because
each statement was consistent with the other, and both statements
were consistent with one of the witness's injuries. 229 The court did
not describe Holden's interest in confrontation, but his interest is
presumably that of every releasee, as described in Morrissey.230
2. Mathews v. Eldridge, Adding a Third Factor
Morrissey provides two essential factors of the procedural due
process analysis: the defendant's interest in his right to confrontation
and the government's interest in denying confrontation. 23 1 Four years
after Morrissey, the Supreme Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge,232
providing the general framework used to determine what procedural
protections due process requires. The factors provided by Mathews
are: (1) the individual interest affected by the government action; (2)
the risk that the procedure used will erroneously deprive the individual
of that interest and the value of any additional procedural safeguards;
and (3) the government's interest, including any burdens an additional
procedural requirement would impose.233 As applied to the question
at issue-the admissibility of hearsay at preliminary examination-
Mathews adds one more factor to be considered in the due process
analysis: the risk the defendant will be erroneously deprived of his
right to confrontation.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family
and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life").
231. Id. at 482-83.
232. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
233. Id. at 335.
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C Applying Morrissey and Mathews to Proposition 115 Hearsay at
Preliminary Examination
The criminally accused share many of the same liberty interests as
the criminally convicted.234 Clearly, the criminally accused retain an
interest in freedom from prosecution based on erroneous
information. 235  Similarly, the State should have no interest in
prosecuting individuals without an initial probable cause
determination, including testing the reliability and veracity of witness
testimony. 236 States would face great expense if there were no
opportunity to evaluate the merits of a prosecution before trial, or at
least before initiating significant discovery processes. The criminally
accused cannot be deprived of their liberty without due process, and
inherent in due process protection is the right to confront witnesses
and hearsay declarants. 237
The pre-trial preliminary examination is analogous to the formal
parole revocation hearing. At both, the defendant is entitled to present
evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to be heard by a
neutral individual.238 The Court has determined that due process
mandates these rights at the parole revocation hearing. 239 Courts have
prohibited the Government from offering the accusatory statements of
234. Cf United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (liberty interests
protected by speedy trial rights include minimizing lengthy incarceration before
trial, reducing the restraint on individual liberty imposed while out on bail, and
shortening the disruption of life caused by pending criminal charges).
235. Cf Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 (describing the societal interest against
parole revocation being based on erroneous information).
236. Cf id. ("[T]here is no interest on the part of the State in revoking parole
without any procedural guarantees at all.").
237. Id. at 489; see also Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 623 F.3d 849, 852-53
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the purpose and value of confrontation, "to ensure
reliability of evidence," is the same whether the right arises out of the Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment).
238. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; see also sources cited supra notes 25-27.
239. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. The Court even held that confrontation
rights applied at the informal preliminary hearing, where no final decision is made.
Id. at 486-87.
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240 241 cie242accomplices,2 experts, and crime victims as hearsay at parole
revocation hearings because the statements lack reliability. However,
Proposition 115 and Whitman made this type of hearsay admissible at
24preliminary examination.24 Unlike the revocation hearing,
preliminary examination is a stage in the criminal prosecution. 244
Thus, criminal defendants should receive at least as much due process
protection as the Court has afforded parolees, if not more.245
Principles from Morrissey and Mathews can be combined to
develop a due process balancing test applicable to Proposition 115
hearsay testimony offered at preliminary examination. The three
factors to be weighed are: (1) the defendant's interest in confronting
hearsay declarants at preliminary examination, measured by the
importance of the hearsay and nature of the facts it proves; (2) the risk
that allowing unverified hearsay at preliminary examination will
erroneously deprive the defendant of his liberty; and (3) the
government's interest in denying confrontation at preliminary
examination.
1. Defendant's Interest in Confrontation
The importance of face-to-face confrontation has long been
recognized throughout the history of the United States. 24 6 Because the
240. United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
hearsay evidence consisting of unsworn statements made by accomplice was not
sufficiently reliable).
241. See United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1993).
242. United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999).
243. See People v. Miranda, I P.3d 73, 80 (Cal. 2000); Hosek v. Super. Ct., 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); supra Part II.B-C.
244. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
245. See Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 623 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2010)
("criminal defendant has an even greater liberty interest" than parolee). It can be
argued, alternatively, that because the parole revocation hearing is the final stage in
the revocation process, greater due process protection should be afforded at that
stage. However, the defendant is subject to a direct deprivation of liberty if he is
bound over for trial at his preliminary examination.
246. "The primary objective of [confrontation] was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness's, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
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determination to be made at a preliminary examination in California is
whether the defendant is held to answer to the charges at trial, he has a
strong interest in confronting the witnesses against him, including
having an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses under oath, while
their memory is still fresh.247 A witness's testimony will always be
more reliable the sooner it is given after an event,248 and this becomes
of increasing concern as delays in court systems increase the length of
time between arrest and trial.
The defendant also has a heightened interest in confrontation
where the reliability and accuracy of the offered statements are called
into question. 249 Under the Morrissey test, the defendant's interest in
confrontation will be measured by the nature of the hearsay statement
and the nature of the facts it is offered to prove.250 While Proposition
115 seeks to protect victims and witnesses of crimes, their out of court
statements should be admitted at preliminary examination under
limited circumstances because "unsworn verbal allegations are the
least reliable type of hearsay." 251 Further, the defendant has a strong
interest in confronting these witnesses if their testimony plays an
integral role in the probable cause determination, and the due process
balancing test finds a heightened interest in hearsay statements that
bears heavily on the court's finding. 252 Former Penal Code section
872(b) contemplated the importance of these witnesses' live
testimony-allowing the prosecutor to admit hearsay at preliminary
examination in the form of a written statement unless the witness was
a victim to or an eyewitness of the crime.253
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
247. See generally id.
248. This principle is reflected, for example, in the hearsay exception for past
recollection recorded. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1237 (West 2004). When a testifying
witness has an insufficient present memory, section 1237 allows the witness to read
a statement from a writing if it was made at a time when the witness's memory was
fresh. Id.
249. United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999).
250. See id. at 1173.
251. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Comito,
177 F.3d at 1171).
252. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1171.
253. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (1990).
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2. The Risk ofErroneous Deprivation ofLiberty
This factor weighs heavily in favor of the defendant because the
court removes any means by which to test the veracity of witness
statements admitted into evidence as hearsay without confrontation.
For example, when a police officer is testifying on behalf of a hearsay
declarant, the officer is unable to answer questions about the
circumstances under which the declarant made the statement. The
testifying officer may never have even spoken with the witness on
whose behalf he is testifying. Especially important under this factor is
eyewitness identification. Proposition 115 opens the door for
scenarios in which a prosecutor offers an eyewitness's hearsay
testimony through a police officer at a preliminary examination, only
to have that eyewitness be unable to identify the defendant at trial. A
defendant in this position is certainly deprived of his liberty
erroneously, and the eyewitness's memory should be tested at the first
opportunity-the preliminary examination.
This does not mean that an absolute bar against the hearsay
statements of crime victims and witnesses should apply. There will
certainly be instances, as in Holden, where the government's interest
outweighs the defendant's interest. If the magistrate is satisfied that
the officer's recital of a witness's statement is sufficiently reliable, or
the Government provides good cause as to why the witness cannot be
produced, the defendant's confrontation rights may be outweighed.
3. Government's Good Cause in Denying Confrontation
Though the text of Proposition 115 explains its general purpose is
to offer protection to victims and witnesses, 254 it does not explain
from what it intended to protect these individuals. Possibilities
include the stress of testifying in court, potential for harassment by the
defendant or other witnesses, and general safety. 2 55 As another goal,
Proposition 115 declared an interest in creating a "system in which
justice is swift and fair." 256 While there is an interest in protecting
witnesses from the emotional and stressful process of giving
254. Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 5.
255. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262, 277 (Cal. 1991) (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
256. See Proposition 115, supra note 1, § 1(c).
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testimony in open court, this must be balanced against the fact that the
defendant's liberty is at stake. The lessened standard of proof at
preliminary examination 257 should ensure that witnesses are not
dragged through lengthy cross-examination. 2 58  Further, the
prosecutor need only call a minimum number of witnesses to meet the
decreased burden of proof at the preliminary examination. 259
Finally, it is important to revisit the fact that the prosecutor has
sole discretion to choose whether to prosecute by indictment or by
information. 260 The Federal Constitution requires one or the other, but
it leaves the decision up to the State. 26' Where the Government
chooses to prosecute by information, it puts the defendant's
fundamental interests on the table to be considered at preliminary
examination. 262 Conversely, if the Government prefers or needs to
rely heavily on hearsay in a certain case, whether to protect witnesses
or because they are difficult to procure, it has the sole discretion of
deciding to proceed by indictment. 2 63 This discretion should provide
257. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872. See also People v. Powers-Monachello, 116
Cal. Rptr. 3d 899, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (the standard of proof at preliminary
examination is whether there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty).
This is a decreased standard from the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable
at trial. See generally People v. Aranda, 283 P.3d 632, 642 (Cal. 2012) (at trial, due
process requires the prosecution to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt).
258. As well as the California Penal Code's mandate that preliminary hearing
not be used as a discovery device. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(b) (West 2014).
259. See generally Mills v. Super. Ct., 728 P.2d 211, 216 (Cal. 1986) (noting
corroborative evidence that would "bolster a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt [at trial] will generally be unnecessary to establish sufficient cause").
260. Hawkins v. Super. Ct., 586 P.2d 916, 921 (Cal. 1978) (the prosecutor has
"completely unfettered discretion" in choosing to prosecute by indictment or
information).
261. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884); see supra Part III.D.
262. Hawkins, 586 P.2d at 917 ("The defendant accused by information
immediately becomes entitled to an impressive array of procedural rights.").
263. It is not to say that indictment is preferred over prosecution by
information. Many argue that the grand jury process denies due process of law and
should be abolished. Johnson v. Super. Ct., 539 P.2d 792, 797 (Cal. 1975) (Mosk,
J., concurring); see generally Richard P. Alexander & Sheldon Portman, Grand Jury
Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process
Issue, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (1974).
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few instances where a prosecutor has good cause to refuse to produce
a witness for confrontation at preliminary examination.
V. How PROPOSITION 115 MAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT FORMER
TESTIMONY RULES
In addition to its effect on confrontation rights, Proposition 115
may have detrimental effects on former testimony rules. While this
comment does not expressly focus on this issue, this section briefly
contemplates the negative effect Proposition 115 may have.
Evidence Code section 1291 provides that an unavailable
witness's former testimony is admissible at a subsequent proceeding if
the opposing party had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, and had an interest and motive similar to that at the current
hearing.264 California courts have routinely admitted preliminary
examination testimony at trial under this rule.265 However, the
California Supreme Court has held that Proposition 115 is more like a
Gerstein hearing, and therefore comes with no right to
confrontation. 2 66  If that is true, the practice of admitting former
testimony under the Evidence Code based on a "right" to cross-
examine is squarely contradictory. The test for former testimony and
confrontation is whether the previous opportunity for cross-
examination was effective.267 When the purpose of the hearing is
merely to find probable cause,2 68 cross-examination is limited, and the
264. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1291 (West 1995).
265. See People v. Gonzales, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
People v. Liddicoat, 174 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Hernandez,
69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
266. Whitman v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 262, 272 (Cal. 1991).
267. People v. Jones, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 2008); see also Cash v. Super. Ct., 110
Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (citing People v. Uhlemann, 511 P.2d 609,
610 (Cal. 1973) ("A preliminary [examination] before a Magistrate is not a trial in
the sense that an adjudication is made as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; it
is a pretrial hearing to establish probable cause . . . .")).
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examination cannot be used for purposes of discovery, 269 it can hardly
be said the defendant had a similar motive for cross-examination.270
CONCLUSION
Proposition 115 deprives criminal defendants of the fundamental
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at preliminary
examination. While the California Supreme Court has declined to
hold the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applies at
preliminary examination, criminal defendants certainly have a due
process right to confrontation at this hearing. A three-part balancing
test rooted in Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process allows
for a fair balance between public interest in effective prosecution and
victim protection and the constitutional rights of the criminally
accused. Applying a balancing test derived from that used in parole
revocation hearings to preliminary examinations would provide a
more fair, reliable, and effective process for criminal defendants.
Micaela De La Cerda*
269. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(b) (West 2008).
270. See United States v. Duenas, 691 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2012) (former
testimony from suppression hearing was inadmissible at trial because the defendant
did not have a similar motive for cross-examination).
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